Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming by Dennis Epple & Richard Romano
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank Roland Benabou, Jonathan Hamilton, David Sappington, two anonymous referees, and workshop
participants at the 1998 NBER Summer Institute, the MacArthur/Brookings Seminar, Cornell University,
Johns Hopkins University, Princeton University, Stanford University, the University of British Columbia,
the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of Kentucky, and the University of Pittsburgh for
comments, and the National Science Foundation and MacArthur Foundation for support. The views expressed
herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2002 by Dennis Epple and Richard Romano.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.Educational Vouchers and Cream Skimming
Dennis Epple and Richard Romano
NBER Working Paper No. 9354
November 2002
JEL No. I2, H42
ABSTRACT
Epple and Romano (1998) show equilibrium provision of education by public and private
schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most-able students, and flat-rate vouchers lead to
further cream skimming.  Here we study voucher design that would inject private-school
competition and increase technical efficiencies without cream skimming.  Conditioning vouchers
on student ability without restriction on participating schools’ policies fails to effect significantly
cream skimming.  However, by adding conditions like tuition constraints such as vouchers can reap
the benefits of school competition without increased stratification.  This can be accomplished while
allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases.
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